Dutch Trade Minister Sjoerd Sjoerdsma arrived in Washington on June 24 with an awkward message for lawmakers drafting the Match Act: your ally is already on board, but the method of enforcement is the problem.

The bipartisan bill, introduced in April, aims to restrict Chinese production of AI semiconductors by threatening allied nations with penalties if they fail to align with U.S. export controls. The Netherlands already cooperates with the U.S. on limiting Dutch chip equipment manufacturer ASML from exporting advanced lithography tools to China. That cooperation, however, was voluntary—built over years of diplomatic alignment.

Sjoerdsma’s objection is not to the goal but to the mechanism. In meetings with Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick and U.S. lawmakers, he warned that provisions in the Match Act would allow the United States to exert control over decisions affecting Dutch national security and the operations of Dutch companies. ‘If the excellent cooperative working relationship with Washington becomes cooperation by force, that is undesirable from our point of view,’ Sjoerdsma said.

The Dutch minister signed a declaration formalizing the Netherlands’ membership in the Pax Silica group, a U.S.-led coalition including South Korea and Japan coordinating AI supply chain governance. Taiwan acts as a non-signatory endorser. The European Union is expected to join later.

Beijing has long argued that U.S. export restrictions are counterproductive, and Chinese technology firms have accelerated domestic chip development under state direction. The Dutch objection suggests even closest partners are uneasy with Washington’s preference for coercion over consensus. For the U.S. AI chip strategy to hold, it needs more than force. It needs willing partners, and the terms of that willingness are being debated in Washington right now.

Image source: v3b.fal.media